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Much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments 
or situations in which an individual's payment depends only on his 
or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors. Academic 
interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions, 
tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the in- 
centive structures they provide. Our paper uses nonexperimental 
data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses. We 
focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the 
incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of individual 
output (players' scores) are both available. We find strong support 
for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in PGA 
tournaments influence players' performance. 
I. Introduction 
In recent years economists have devoted considerable attention to the 
normative properties of alternative compensation arrangements. 
We have discussed our work in workshops at Cornell, Columbia, North Carolina 
(Greensboro), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Arizona, Minnesota, the Na- 
tional Bureau of Economic Research, North Carolina State, Oberlin, Chicago, Pitts- 
burgh, Brigham Young, Virginia, Northwestern, Amherst, Kentucky, Georgia State, 
and Brandeis, and we are grateful to numerous colleagues at these institutions and to a 
referee for their comments. This paper is based on work supported by the National 
Science Foundation under grant SES-8719592. The data set used in this paper will be 
archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (P.O. Box 
1248, Ann Arbor, Mich.) after January 1, 1991. 
Journal of Political Economy, 1990, vol. 98, no. 6] 
? 1990 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/90/9806-0001$01.50 
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Among the arrangements discussed have been tournaments, or situa- 
tions in which an individual's payment depends only on his or her 
output or rank relative to that of other competitors (see, e.g., Lazear 
and Rosen 1981; Carmichael 1983; Green and Stokey 1983; Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz 1983; Malcomson 1984; O'Keefe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser 
1986; Rosen 1986). Tournament models are of more than academic 
interest since they may well describe the compensation structures ap- 
plicable to many corporate executives, to professors (who can be 
thought of as being involved in promotion tournaments), to salespeo- 
ple (whose bonuses often depend on their relative outputs), and to the 
more obvious example of professional sports tournaments. Academic 
interest derives from the fact that, under certain sets of assumptions, 
tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the in- 
centive structures they provide. 
Very few attempts have been made to test whether tournaments 
actually elicit desired effort responses. One experimental study of 
rank-order tournaments that used 225 paid undergraduate student 
volunteers as subjects did find mixed support for the theory, although 
disadvantaged (high-cost-of-effort) subjects provided more effort 
than the theory predicted (see Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). The 
lack of nonexperimental studies of tournaments is probably due to 
the difficulty of measuring both individuals' effort levels and the in- 
centive structures competitors face in many circumstances. 
To test in a nonexperimental setting whether tournaments do have 
incentive effects, we focus on golf tournaments because information 
on the incentive structure (prize distribution) and measures of indi- 
vidual output (players' scores) are both available. Under suitable as- 
sumptions, players' scores can be related to their effort and implica- 
tions for scores drawn. In addition, data are available to control for 
factors other than the incentive structure that should affect output; 
these factors include player quality, quality of the rest of the field, 
difficulty of the course, and weather conditions. Implications can be 
drawn for both how well a player will perform during an entire tour- 
nament and how well he will perform on the last (fourth) round 
contingent, other things equal, on the marginal return to effort he 
faces in the tournament after the third round. Our empirical analyses 
make use of data from the 1984 men's Professional Golf Association 
(PGA) tour.1 
1 A short nontechnical companion paper (Ehrenberg and Bognanno 1990) replicates 
a portion of the empirical analyses presented here using data from the 1987 men's 
European PGA tour. 
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FIG. 1.-Share of total prize money going to players of different ranks: 1984 men's 
PGA tournament in the sample. 
II. The 1984 Men's PGA Tour: Institutional 
Characteristics and Hypotheses to Be Tested 
The typical golf tournament is composed of four rounds. Half the 
field is "cut" at the end of the second round, two additional rounds 
are played, and then prizes are awarded on the basis of the players' 
ranks after the final round. Of the 45 tournaments on the 1984 men's 
PGA tour, 40 were of this type, and data from them are used in our 
analyses. 
Across these tournaments the structure of prize money by rank was 
virtually identical, although the level of prize money varied across 
tournaments.2 Figure 1 summarizes this structure. A key element of 
2 See Official 1985 PGA Tour Media Guide (1984). Of the 39 tournaments actually used 
in the study (the British Open was excluded for reasons that will be made clear shortly), 
9 offered total prize levels between $200,000 and $350,000, 16 had a total prize level of 
$400,000, 8 had a total prize level of $500,000, and 6 offered total prize money in the 
$565,000-$800,000 range. 
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the prize structure is that the marginal return from improving one's 
performance by one rank (or by not seeing one's performance decline 
by one rank) was much higher for people who were close to the 
leaders after three rounds than it was for people who were far from 
the leaders. For example, the marginal prize received from finishing 
second instead of third was 4.0 percent of the total tournament prize 
money, while the marginal prize received from finishing twenty- 
second instead of twenty-third was 0.1 percent of the total tourna- 
ment prize money. 
This structure of prizes, coupled with variations in the level of 
prizes across tournaments, suggests two types of tests of the hy- 
pothesis that tournament-type prize structures have incentive effects. 
First, since the structure of prizes is constant across tournaments, the 
prize differential for "winning" depends only on the level of total 
prize money. Thus one can focus on a tournament as a whole and ask, 
other things equal, whether higher total prize money leads to lower 
scores. Second, one can focus only on the last round of a tournament 
and ask, other things equal, whether a player's performance on the 
last round depends on the marginal return to effort he faces. The 
marginal return to effort will depend in turn on the total prize money 
in the tournament, the player's rank after the third round, and how 
many players are tightly bunched around him after three rounds. 
Both types of analyses are reported in the next section. 
Before turning to the empirical results, however, we must discuss 
one institutional complication. Not every pro golfer who wanted to 
enter any given PGA tournament in 1984 could. Rather, a system of 
exemptions and priorities existed. At the risk of simplifying a very 
complex system, the system worked as follows (see 1984 Player's Hand- 
book): (i) Any golfer who had won a major tournament since 1975 or 
any PGA tour tournament in 1983 could enter any tournament he 
wanted in both 1984 and 1985. (ii) Any golfer who failed to qualify 
under category i and had won a major tournament in 1975 or any 
PGA tour tournament in 1982 could enter any tournament he wanted 
in 1984 but had no promise of entry for tournaments in 1985. (iii) If 
not all positions in a 1984 tournament were filled by individuals from 
categories i and ii, any golfer who finished among the top 125 money 
winners on the 1983 PGA tour could enter the tournament. (iv) Any 
remaining vacancies in a tournament were filled using other criteria 
(e.g., the sponsor-chosen players, lower-ranked players on the 1983 
tour, or leaders from the PGA tour qualifying tournament). 
As we shall show, this system of exemptions and priorities helps to 
explain which players entered which 1984 PGA tour tournaments; 
this is important because analyses that use data on the scores of en- 
trants to tournaments will be subject to potential selectivity biases. In 
INCENTIVE EFFECTS 1311 
addition, individuals in categories ii, iii, and iv had to be very con- 
cerned about their total tour earnings in 1984. For unless they won a 
PGA tour tournament during the year, they had to finish in the top 
125 money winners during the year in order to be assured of virtual 
automatic entry, if they desired, to PGA tour tournaments in 1985 
(i.e., to be in category iii in 1985). In contrast, no matter what individ- 
uals in category i accomplished during the 1984 tour, they were as- 
sured the option of entry into any PGA tour tournament that they 
wanted to enter in 1985. 
Suppose that the latter group, whom we refer to henceforth as the 
exempt players, exhibited effort levels that were sensitive to the level 
and structure of prizes in a tournament. Because the former group, 
whom we henceforth refer to as the nonexempt players, had to worry 
about qualifying for the next year's tour, the level and structure of 
prize money in a tournament may not be an accurate indicator of 
their marginal financial return to effort. Rather, one would need to 
know also how an increase in effort for one of them increased the 
probability that he would be classified as an exempt player in 1985 
and what the expected increase in the present value of his future 
earnings would be if he was so classified. As such, even if the exempt 
and nonexempt players' marginal responses to financial returns were 
equal, one might intuitively "expect" nonexempt players' effort levels, 
and hence scores, to be less sensitive to tournament-specific prize 
variables. An appendix (available from the authors) presents a simple 
omitted-variables model that indicates the precise (and restrictive) 
conditions under which this expectation is theoretically correct, and 
in the next section, we test to see whether responses differ between 
the two groups. 
III. Empirical Analyses 
Our empirical analyses proceed in stages. First, we estimate final- 
score equations for players on the 1984 men's PGA tour. Next, we 
estimate the score after the second-round equations. Finally, we esti- 
mate final-round score equations. 
A. Final-Score Equations 
Our empirical work is based on two-contestant tournament models 
with heterogeneous competitors. Assuming that an individual's score 
is linearly related to his effort/concentration level, a tournament- 
specific effect (due to course difficulty and weather conditions), and 
random factors and that effort/concentration has positive and in- 
creasing marginal cost, one can show that a player's final score in a 
1312 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
tournament will depend on the prize differential for winning, mea- 
sures of his and his opponent's ability, and tournament-specific fac- 
tors.3 
Data are available in the 1985 Golf Digest Almanac (1984) and the 
Official 1985 PGA Tour Media Guide (1984) for each 1984 men's PGA 
tournament on the score by round, final rank, and prize money won 
for all players who entered and made the cut in each tournament. 
Data on each player's scoring average on all rounds during the year, a 
measure of his "ability," are available only for the top 160 money 
winners during the year; consequently, the analyses reported below 
are restricted to these individuals. Equations were estimated (with the 
data pooled across individuals and tournaments) in the form 
Sji = ao + ajTPRIZEj + a2X, + a3Yj + a4z, + Vii, (1) 
where sj, is the final score of individuals in tournament i, TPRIZE is 
the total prize money awarded in the tournament, xi is a vector of 
variables to control for the difficulty of the tournament course and 
weather conditions, yj is a vector of proxies for player j's ability, z- is a 
vector of variables to control for the quality of other players in the 
field, and vi0 is a random error term. If the theory of tournaments is 
correct, higher prizes should lead to lower scores; hence estimates of 
a, should be negative. 
The controls for other tournament-specific factors are PAR, the 
par for the tournament course; DIST, the total course yardage; RAT- 
ING, the PGA's evaluation of the playing difficulty of the course as it 
was set up for the tournament (expressed in strokes); and WAVE, the 
average of three raters' perceptions of the number of days during the 
tournament in which the weather significantly influenced player per- 
formance. A player's ability is proxied by SCOREAVE, his scoring 
average on all rounds played during the 1984 tour, and FCUT, the 
fraction of tournaments he entered in which he made the cut during 
the 1984 tour. Finally, quality of the other players in the field is 
proxied by FRACT, the fraction of all players in the tournament who 
made the cut that were ranked in the top 160 of total prize winners 
during the 1984 tour, and MPERAVE, a measure of the mean "per- 
formance average" on the 1984 tour of players in the tournament 
who made the cut.4 
3 See Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1989) for details. 
4 A player's performance average is a measure of how well he placed in the tourna- 
ments he entered during the year, with high performance averages indicating better 
players. The factors PAR, DIST, SCOREAVE, FCUT, FRACT, and MPERAVE were 
obtained from the 1985 Golf Digest Almanac. One-paragraph descriptions of the 
weather conditions that players faced each day of each tournament were obtained from 
the Official 1985 PGA Tour Media Guide; an average of three raters' perceptions of 
whether the weather each day adversely affected player performance (WAVE) was 
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Estimates are reported in table 1. Separate analyses are presented 
for the entire sample, for the exempt players, and for the nonexempt 
players.5 A dummy variable for whether a tournament is a "major" 
tournament (i.e., the U.S. Open, the PGA, or the Masters) is also 
included.6 Winning a major tournament typically provides substantial 
opportunities for lucrative endorsements; hence the total prize 
money variable understates the return to winning these tournaments. 
As seen in the table, more difficult courses, as measured by PAR, 
DIST, and RATING, are seen to lead to higher scores. Similarly, each 
day of "bad" weather appears to raise players' scores by over two 
strokes. As expected, poorer players, as measured by SCOREAVE, 
play worse. Where significant, competing against a better field, as 
measured by FRACT and MPERAVE, appears to lead to higher 
scores. 
Most striking, the coefficient of TPRIZE is negative as anticipated. 
The variable TPRIZE is measured in thousands of dollars; hence 
increasing the total prize money by $100,000 is associated with each 
player's, on average, scoring 1.1 strokes lower during a tournament 
(col. 1). The results of estimating an equation in which TPRIZE is 
interacted with exempt status (col. 2) and of estimating separate equa- 
tions for exempt (col. 3) and nonexempt (col. 4) players suggest that 
the coefficient of TPRIZE is slightly larger (in absolute value) for 
exempt players. As noted in the previous section, this may reflect 
either that exempt players' effort levels are more responsive to 
financial variables or that the nonexempt players' TPRIZE coefficient 
is biased toward zero because their marginal return to effort is also 
based both on how doing well in a tournament increases their proba- 
bility of being classified as exempt in the next year and on what their 
expected increase in the present value of future income would be if so 
classified. Finally, other things equal, scores are lower in major tour- 
naments but significantly so only for exempt players (col. 3). Since 
these players are the ones with the greatest chance of winning and 
thus gaining the endorsement value, this result seems sensible. 
Several extensions warrant brief mention here. First, the results in 
table 1 may be subject to selection bias because the sample is restricted 
to the subset of players who entered and made the cut in each tourna- 
then constructed. Finally, RATING was obtained for a majority of the courses from Jay 
Matolla of the Metropolitan Golf Association and for the other courses through tele- 
phone calls to state golf associations. 
5 When a nonexempt player won a tournament, his status was changed to exempt for 
subsequent tournaments in the year. 
6 The British Open, the fourth major golf tournament, was excluded from the anal- 
yses both because RATING was not available for it and because relatively few of the top 
U.S. players enter it. As a result, our sample actually includes 39 tournaments. 
z--s~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
 
bID
s S-t-s 
-0s- 
-
 
v
 
rY
 
F 
X
 
n
 
t 
>
 
r 
O
 
m
 
~
~
~
~
nK
 
LO
 
C
 
X
 
o6 
c6 
4 
Ec, 
; 
q; 
ci 
o
 
C
- 
C) 
C
4 
0 
L 
z 
o
 
"t 
"t 
LO
 
0 
z 
.4 
O
 o 
O
 o 
-
 
<
 
-
 V
 
=
~
~C
- 
>
 
E 
Q 
zZ 
->
 
Q 
Q 
Q ~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~C
 
M
 
Z 
<
 
Q 
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
w
 
C
 C
 X
 
<
 
N
 
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~>
 
, C
L 
X
t 
~
 ~
 
~
 
~
 
~
~L 
n
 
C) 
r- 
-
 
X
c 
n
s 
C
4L 
w
 
6 
_
 
, 
L6 
o6 
c6 
-
 
_
 
6 
r- 
_
rtQ 
z 
G
z 
-
 
>
 
esc<
 
-Y
.;5 
C
 
-
 
_
 
s 
Z 
G
m
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-- E 
,? 
-
 ? f 
X
~~~~~~~t 
:\l a 
t 
n0 
.c(4 
.o
 
M
, 
S =Q 
O
~~~~~~- 
a
nl 
O
 
a
n
 
G
ul 
C) 
't 
C
T 
o
 
t 
o
n
 
n) 
co
cu
 
0 
e 
^Z 
; 
I 
E 
X
 
<
 
O
 
N
 
>I 
c 
S 
S 
o
 
o
 
S 
@
,C
 X
 
S~C
~ 
b 
C
h~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I.-> 
t3 
v
 
, 
x
 
-
 / 
v
o
 cr Q ,~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
v
 
C
7 
u
 
^
 
_
 
c)- m
 s-m
 
Iz 
14 
t- 
L 
C
4 
Ln 
n
 
t -
 E 
X
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-
 
-5 
O
 :t 
c Q 
-
~
 H
6 4; 
6 r 
? 
6 
cn
 
o6 c 6 
7 
2a 
INCENTIVE EFFECTS 1315 
ment. Because of this, the effect of the total prize variable on players' 
final scores may be confounded with its effect on their entering and 
making the cut in a tournament. To control for this possible problem, 
one must have data on the players who entered each tournament and 
failed to make the cut; fortunately the PGA was able to provide us this 
information, as well as data on these players' scores during the first 
two rounds of the tournament. 
To model separately the decision to enter a tournament and the 
probability of making the cut and then to estimate a bivariate selection 
model is a difficult task. Instead, we approximated this process and 
estimated a univariate probit equation of the probability of entering 
and making the cut. Following the approach initially suggested by 
Heckman (1979), we then used estimates from this equation to com- 
pute an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio for each individual, which 
was entered as an additional explanatory variable in equation (1) to 
control for selectivity bias. However, when this augmented final-score 
equation was reestimated, the coefficient of the additional variable 
never proved significant; nor did the TPRIZE coefficients differ from 
those reported in table 1. Thus the estimates in table 1 do not appear 
to be subject to selection bias. 
Second, the precision of the estimates presented in table 1 may be 
overstated because by implicitly assuming that the random error term 
is independent and identically distributed, we have not allowed for 
tournament-specific disturbances that are uncorrelated with the ex- 
planatory variables. One way to take account of this problem is to pool 
data within tournaments and to reestimate (1) using 39 observations 
on within-tournament averages as the units of observation. When this 
was done, the magnitude of the TPRIZE coefficient remained the 
same; however, its t-statistic fell to approximately 1.9. Alternatively, 
one can estimate a random effects model that allows for disturbances 
that have a component that is drawn randomly for each tournament 
from a distribution with zero mean but that is the same for each 
player in each tournament. When this was done, the TPRIZE coef- 
ficient was no longer statistically significant for nonexempt players; 
however, the coefficient continued to have the correct sign and re- 
mained statistically significant for exempt players. 
B. Score after Second-Round Equations 
Given the availability of data on the score after two rounds for all 
individuals who enter each tournament, we can estimate how the level 
of prize money influences players' performance in the early rounds of 
a tournament. Table 2 presents estimates similar to those found in 
table 1, except that the sample is now all entrants in each tournament 
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(among the top 160 money winners in the year) and the outcome 
variable is now the player's score after the second round, prior to the 
cut's being made. In addition, the weather variable now refers to the 
weather on the first two days of the tournament and the field quality 
variables to all entrants in each tournament rather than to those who 
made the cut. 
The most striking finding is that the total tournament prize money 
does not appear to influence players' performance during the first 
two rounds. Only for exempt players in the specification in which 
exempt status is interacted with the prize variable (col. 2) is there any 
evidence of an effect, and even for this group, an increase in prize 
money of $100,000 would be associated with scores that were only 0.1 
strokes lower per player after the first two rounds. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that a player's difficulty in maintaining 
concentration occurs primarily in the later rounds of a tournament 
when fatigue is more likely to have set in.7 
Of course, the possibility still exists that the results in table 2 are 
subject to selection bias because they are based on a sample of tourna- 
ment entrants; we may be confounding the effect of a tournament's 
prize level on the probability that players enter the tournament with 
its effect on their scores. To check for this, Heckman's (1979) two-step 
procedure was once again employed. First, several probit equations of 
the probability of entering a tournament were estimated in which 
entry probabilities were specified to be a function of a player's exempt 
status, his total career earnings prior to 1984, his age, the chronolog- 
ical order of a tournament during the year, the status of the tourna- 
ment as a major tournament, the tournament's total prize money, and 
the player's scoring average on all rounds in which he played during 
the 1984 tour or on all first and second rounds in which he played 
during the tour. Separate sets of coefficients were estimated for ex- 
empt and nonexempt players.8 
These estimates were used to obtain estimates of the inverse Mills 
ratio for each individual entered in each tournament, and augmented 
versions of the score after the second-round equations were then 
7 Generalizations of tournament theory to the n-person case suggest that the mar- 
ginal response of effort to the prize spread declines as the number of competitors gets 
larger (see McLaughlin 1988). Since roughly twice as many players compete in the first 
two rounds of a tournament as in the last two, this provides another explanation for 
why one might observe scores for the tournament as a whole that are more sensitive to 
tournament prize levels than scores for the first two rounds. 
8 These estimates are found in Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1989) and are consistent 
with hypotheses from tournament theory that individuals will "sort" themselves into 
tournaments. For example, exempt players were seen to be more likely, and nonex- 
empt players less likely, to enter major tournaments and tournaments with higher prize 
money. 
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estimated. However, again the coefficients of the estimated inverse 
Mills ratio never proved significant, and the estimated coefficients of 
the total prize variable were identical to those found in table 2. Thus 
the conclusion that the level of prize money at best only marginally 
affects the level of effort during the first two rounds for exempt 
players and does not affect the level of effort during that time for 
nonexempt players appears to be valid. 
C. Final-Round Score Equations 
Consider a golfer playing in two tournaments with the same total 
prize money. Suppose that he scores a 72 on each of the first 3 days of 
both tournaments, but because of random factors that influence his 
opponents' performance, he finds himself in third place in the first 
tournament but in twentieth place in the second tournament. Given 
the structure of PGA tournament prizes (fig. 1), he faces a greater 
marginal return to effort/concentration in the first tournament, 
should exert more effort/concentration there, and, on average, 
should have a lower final-round score in that tournament. 
Of course, a player's rank after three rounds and the total tourna- 
ment prize money are only two of the elements that influence the 
marginal return to effort/concentration that he faces. One must also 
take into account how closely his competitors are "bunched" around 
him. As such, we defined six different variables to serve as proxies for 
the marginal return to effort an individual faces. These are all illus- 
trated in figure 2. 
In the figure, suppose that the curve PP shows the relationship 
between a player's final rank in a tournament and the prize money he 
will be awarded. Consider an individual who after the third round is 
at rank R. If he remains at that rank, he will be awarded the amount 
OA at the end of the tournament. 
The first three marginal return variables we compute ignore how 
tightly bunched competitors are around the player and are based on 
the return to improving performance, or of having it get worse, by 
one rank. The variable DPRIZE3 is the actual marginal reduction in 
prize money if the individual's rank at the end of the tournament was 
one higher (worse) than his current rank; this is given by AD in the 
figure. The variable UPRIZE3 is the actual increase in prize money 
the individual would gain if he improved his rank by one; this is given 
by AC. The variable MIDPRIZ3 assumes that the individual takes into 
account the cost of losing one rank, as well as the benefit from im- 
proving one rank. It is defined as the actual average absolute change 
in prize money if the rank at the end of the tournament is either one 
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FIG. 2.-Alternative measures of marginal return to effort/concentration in a tour- 
nament. 
lower or one higher than R, and it is given in the figure by the average 
of the lengths of AC and AD. 
Presumably, increased effort/concentration directly affects a play- 
er's score, not his rank. The effect of increased concentration on rank 
then depends on the number of competitors closely bunched around 
the player. The next three measures take this into account. They are 
the actual increase in prize money the individual would receive if he 
improved his scores relative to those of his competitors by one stroke 
(LESIPRIZ), two strokes (LES2PRIZ), or three strokes (LES3PRIZ). 
If improvements of one, two, and three strokes would cause the indi- 
vidual's rank to improve, respectively, to S, T, and U in the figure, 
these variables' magnitudes in turn would be given by AE, AF, and 
AG. 
Each of these six variables was computed for each individual in 
each tournament. Equations were then estimated, using data pooled 
across individuals and tournaments, in which a player's score in the 
1320 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
final round of a tournament was specified to be a function of his 
scores on the first 3 days of the tournament, the adverse effect of 
weather, if any, on players' performance on the first 3 days and on the 
final day of the tournament, and a marginal return to effort variable. 
Given the weather, a player's scores on the first 3 days, which are 
probably the best predictors of how well he is currently playing, 
should be positively associated with his score on the final day. Given 
his scores on the first 3 days, the poorer the weather was on those 
days, the lower his score on the final day should be. However, the 
poorer the weather on the final day, other things equal, the higher his 
score on the final day should be. 
A player's scores on the first 3 days of a tournament are not exoge- 
nous, but rather depend on the prize differential for winning, mea- 
sures of his and his opponents' ability, and tournament-specific fac- 
tors such as course difficulty and the weather on those days. Similarly, 
the estimated marginal return to effort a player faces is also not 
exogenous since it depends on his scores and his opponents' scores on 
the first 3 days, both of which depend in turn on the factors described 
above. As such, a player's scores on the first 3 days and the marginal 
return to effort he faces on the last day are treated as endogenous and 
the equations are estimated using an instrumental variable method. 
Estimates of the coefficients of the marginal return to effort vari- 
ables from these equations are reported in table 3. The pattern of 
results is remarkably consistent across specifications. The marginal 
return to effort variables do affect players' scores in the final round, 
with larger marginal returns associated with lower scores.9 This result 
is observed, however, only for exempt players. The magnitudes of the 
relationship for each of the marginal return to effort variables (except 
for LES3PRIZ) are such that, other things equal, a player whose mar- 
ginal return to effort was one standard deviation above the mean 
marginal return in the sample would score 1.0-1.7 strokes lower in 
the final round of the tournament.10 
One may argue that, in theory, a player's effort in the last round of 
a tournament also depends on his ability relative to that of the players 
who are closely bunched around him. To see how inclusion of such 
measures would influence the importance of financial variables, we 
9 Formal specification tests (see Hausman 1978) permit one to reject the hypothesis 
that the set of variables treated as endogenous should be treated as exogenous. This 
finding is important because if one erroneously treats them as exogenous, many of the 
coefficients of the marginal prize variables switch signs and become positive. 
10 See Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1989) for details. The estimated LES3PRIZ effect 
is less than one stroke. Improving one's performance by three strokes relative to that of 
one's competitors in a round is a difficult task, so this measure is probably less relevant 
than the others. 
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TABLE 3 
COEFFICIENTS OF MARGINAL RETURN TO EFFORT VARIABLES IN FINAL-ROUND-SCORE 
EQUATIONS FOR THE 1984 MEN'S PGA TOUR: VARIOUS SPECIFICATIONS 
Specification All Exempt Nonexempt 
DPRIZE3 -.042 -.042 -.032 
(2.7) (1.8) (.9) 
UPRIZE3 - .236 -.310 -.070 
(3.5) (2.6) (.6) 
MIDPRIZ3 -.212 -.278 -.088 
(3.3) (2.5) (.8) 
LES3PRIZ -.049 -.052 .009 
(2.0) (1.3) (.3) 
LES2PRIZ -.088 -.135 .025 
(2.6) (2.4) (.5) 
LES1PRIZ -.181 -.306 .105 
(2.7) (2.5) (1.0) 
NOTE.-Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. DPRIZE3 is the actual marginal reduction in prize 
money (in thousands) if rank at the end of the tournament is one higher (worse) than the individual's third-round 
rank; UPRIZE3 is the actual marginal increase in prize money (in thousands) if rank at the end of the tournament is 
one lower than the individual's third-round rank; MIDPRIZ3 is the actual average marginal absolute changes in 
prize money (in thousands) if rank at the end of the tournament is one lower or one higher than the individual's 
third-round rank; and LES3PRIZ is the actual marginal increase in prize money (in thousands) if the individual 
improved his rank after the third round by reducing his score by three strokes relative to the rest of the field 
(LES2PRIZ = two strokes, LESIPRIZ = one stroke). All specifications also include SCOREI, SCORE2, SCORE3, 
WAVE123, and WAVE4 and use instruments used for SCOREI, SCORE2, SCORE3, and the marginal return to 
effort variables. The instruments were obtained using TPRIZE, MAJ, PAR, DIST, RATING, FRACT, MPERAVE, 
FCUT, SCOREAVE (which are all defined in table 1), and SCORE12, the player's scoring average on all first and 
second rounds he played on the 1984 tour; SCORE3A, the player's scoring average on all third rounds he played in 
the 1984 tour; WAVE1-WAVE3, average of three raters' perceptions of whether the weather significantly in- 
fluenced player performance during the first, second, and third rounds, respectively, of the tournament; and 
PERAVE, the player's performance average on the 1984 PGA tour (see table 1). 
computed for each player in each tournament the differences be- 
tween his average score per round during the year and the average of 
the average scores per round during the year of all players within two 
and three strokes of him, in either direction, at the end of the third 
round of play in the tournament. These variables (one at a time) were 
added to the specifications that underlie table 3, and these extended 
equations were reestimated for the exempt sample. Since the average 
ability of the players around a player after the third round is endoge- 
nous, instruments for these relative ability variables were also used. 
It is quite striking that, although the magnitudes of the coefficients 
of the marginal prize variables declined slightly when the controls for 
competitor quality were included, one still observes larger marginal 
prizes being associated with lower final-round scores. " Furthermore, 
all the marginal prize variables' coefficients, except one, remained 
statistically significantly different from zero. 
" See Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1989) for results. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has provided nonexperimental evidence that tournaments 
have incentive effects. Our analyses of data from the 1984 men's PGA 
tour suggest that the level and structure of prize money do influence 
players' performance. Higher prize levels do lead, other things equal, 
to lower scores, but this effect occurs primarily in the later rounds of a 
tournament when fatigue has set in and it is more difficult for players 
to maintain concentration. Given a player's performance in the first 
three rounds of a tournament, his performance in the last round also 
appears, other things equal, to depend on the marginal returns to 
effort he faces, with players who face larger marginal returns scoring 
lower. The level of prize money in tournaments also influences who 
enters the tournaments, with higher prize money attracting better 
(exempt) players. 
The influence of tournament prizes on performance was observed 
primarily for exempt players. As described above, this may reflect 
either that exempt players are more responsive to the reward struc- 
ture or that a tournament's prize level does not adequately reflect the 
reward structure that nonexempt players face, since these players 
must be concerned with how their finish in a tournament will in- 
fluence their probability of qualifying for exempt status on next year's 
tour. Evidence we have obtained from analyses of data from the 1984 
men's senior tour for golfers aged 50 and older, which are reported 
elsewhere, provides some support for the former hypotheses: that 
better players are, in fact, more responsive to financial incentives.12 
Our work is only an initial empirical study of the incentive effects of 
tournaments, and there are a number of directions in which future 
research might proceed. First, replications and extensions using data 
from other sports in which absolute measures of output are available, 
the level and structure of prize money differ, and the form of tourna- 
ments differs would obviously be desirable. Professional bowling is 
particularly attractive in this regard because bowling tournaments 
have a match play element to them in their concluding stages.'3 Anal- 
yses using data from more than one year would also be desirable; our 
within-year analyses focus on how players allocate effort/concen- 
tration within a year but show no evidence on how increasing prize 
levels over time influence who enters the profession and the re- 
sources they devote to conditioning and practice during the "off- 
season." 
12 These analyses are not reported here for brevity (see Ehrenberg and Bognanno 
1989). 
13 Research using data from professional bowling is undertaken in Bognanno (1990). 
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Second, all our analyses are derived from simple two-person mod- 
els that yield implications for the output/scores of an individual 
player. Generalization to n-person tournaments would yield implica- 
tions about the entire distribution of scores one might expect to ob- 
serve, and empirical analyses of the distribution of final scores could 
then be undertaken. 
Third, our analyses assumed that the tournament prize structure 
influences output/scores through its effect on effort/concentration 
levels. Players can also choose conservative (e.g., hit down the center 
of a fairway) or risky (e.g., try to cut across a dogleg) strategies, and 
depending on a player's ability relative to the rest of the field or his 
rank after each round, different strategies may be pursued. Models 
that also included the choice of strategies that differ in risk undoubt- 
edly would yield additional empirical implications.'4 
Fourth, there are normative issues relating to the level and struc- 
ture of prizes that we actually observe in tournaments. Can we infer 
from this structure what the objective functions of the PGA tour and 
tournament sponsors actually are? Can we estimate whether the mar- 
ginal cost to sponsors of higher-prize tournaments is less than, equal 
to, or greater than the marginal benefits they receive? Can we infer 
whether golf tournaments' prizes are structured efficiently? To an- 
swer such questions will require one to go far beyond the scores of 
players in tournaments and to analyze more generally the operations 
of the PGA tour and its sponsors. 
Finally, while analyses of sports tournaments are of interest in 
themselves, there is the broader question of the extent to which tour- 
nament theory can help to provide an explanation for the structure of 
compensation we observe among corporate executives. As is well 
known, situations in which opportunities exist for one executive to 
sabotage a rival's performance are not conducive to tournament-type 
pay structures (see Lazear 1989). Nevertheless, devising ways to em- 
pirically address this question should rank high on the research 
agenda of economists interested in compensation issues. 
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